Metadata of the chapter that will be visualized online Chapter Title Subsistence Rights Copyright Year 2011 Copyright Holder Springer Science+Business Media B.V. Family Name Rivera Particle Given Name Lisa Corresponding Author Suffix Division Department of Philosophy Organization University of Massachusetts, Boston Address 100 Morrissey Blvd, Boston, MA, 02125, USA Email lisarivera@gmail.com; lisa.rivera@umb.edu Comp. by: KJayaraja Stage: Galleys Chapter No.: 498 Title Name: EGJ Page Number: 0 Date:15/3/11 Time:18:02:04 1 S 2 Subsistence Rights 3 LISA RIVERA 4 Department of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts, 5 Boston, Boston, MA, USA 6 Subsistence rights – rights to those things humans need to 7 lead minimally decent lives – are often conceived of by 8 their supporters as a basic part of the demand for global 9 economic justice. Satisfying a person's subsistence rights 10 means ensuring that they securely possess enough food, 11 shelter, clean water, medical care, and unpolluted sur12 roundings to lead a decent life. Subsistence rights target 13 the basic welfare of human beings rather than their 14 flourishing. Defenders of subsistence rights regard them 15 as universal human rights in that they do not depend on 16 particular relationships, such as nationality, and are 17 guaranteed equally to every human being. They may cor18 respond to universal duties on everyone's part to ensure, 19 to whatever extent possible, that no person is deprived of 20 these indispensable goods. Establishing institutions to 21 promote global justice is generally thought of as an essen22 tial part of the realization of subsistence rights. Thus, the 23 individual duty to meet subsistence rights could possibly 24 be discharged were there international mechanisms and 25 institutions to ensure that everyone has enough to meet 26 their basic needs. 27 Subsistence rights are among the most controversial 28 rights connected to global justice issues. The main con29 troversies focus on whether economic rights like subsis30 tence have the same legitimacy as civil and political rights 31 like liberty and security; on who, if anyone, is responsible 32 for meeting and enforcing subsistence rights globally; and 33 on whether it is feasible to meet subsistence rights. 34 The growing concern with global justice in the 35 twentieth century is reflected in several international 36 agreements that advance a right to subsistence. Article 25 37 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 38 states a right to a standard of living that ensures health, 39 well-being, food, clothing, housing, and medical care. The 40 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 41Rights (ICESCR) commits governments to progressively 42realize a right to an adequate standard of living, good 43health, and social security and social insurance, as well as 44various labor rights. Some national constitutions also 45guarantee their own citizens' rights to their basic needs. 46The presence of national and international agreements 47guaranteeing subsistence rights cannot eliminate skepti48cism that subsistence rights are genuine. The UDHR and 49the ICESCR do not clearly establish mechanisms to 50enforce these rights or to enable rights-holders to claim 51them nationally or internationally. Therefore, some argue 52that these agreements express aspirational moral beliefs 53rather than genuine rights. 54Satisfying subsistence rights would curtail the acute 55suffering and premature death of vast numbers of the 56world's people who lack the basic necessities for a decent 57life. TheWorld Bank estimates that almost half the world's 58people live in severe poverty, on less than two dollars a day. 59Approximately 1.1 billion people, or one-sixth of those on 60earth, live in extreme poverty, measured as less than one 61dollar a day. Annually, approximately six million children 62die of hunger and 18 million people die prematurely 63from poverty-related causes. Virtually all extreme poverty 64occurs in economically undeveloped or developing 65nations. Globally, there are enough resources to eliminate 66extreme poverty. In 2000, the United Nations set Millen67nium Development Goals (MDGs) to cut extreme poverty 68in half by 2010. This target was not met. 69We are familiar with the idea that it is morally good for 70the global rich to help the global poor for humanitarian 71reasons. Part of the significance of subsistence rights to 72debates about global justice is that, if such rights do exist, 73current levels of poverty are not primarily a failure of the 74global rich to act on duties of beneficence but a gross 75injustice. Thus, the global poor are entitled to relief from 76their poverty, and the current global situation is as much 77an infringement on the rights of the poor as a denial of 78their liberty would be. 79The enlightenment model of rights found in social 80contract theories is a main historical foundation for 81human rights. The idea that every human being has 82a right to liberty and security has a strong foothold in 83the ensuing liberal political tradition that shapes modern Deen K. Chatterjee (ed.), Encyclopedia of Global Justice, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4020-9160-5, # Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011 Comp. by: KJayaraja Stage: Galleys Chapter No.: 498 Title Name: EGJ Page Number: 0 Date:15/3/11 Time:18:02:04 84 democratic societies and international human rights dis85 course. The same conceptual justifications for other 86 human rights also justify subsistence rights. A basic level 87 of physical well-being is necessary for agency and auton88 omy. Severe economic deprivation denies people their 89 basic dignity. 90 Although some reject expansion of rights to include 91 economic rights like subsistence, Henry Shue argues that 92 subsistence rights are entailed by accepting other rights. 93 Subsistence, security, and liberty constitute a set of basic 94 rights: Each must be satisfied for a person to enjoy any 95 right whatsoever. For example, an ill or starving person 96 cannot participate effectively in politics or defend them97 selves in court. Some have argued that it is not literally 98 impossible for a person who suffers material deprivation 99 to exercise their other rights. Shue's point is that rights 100 must be socially guaranteed and those in extreme want are 101 not secure in their possession of any rights. 102 One objection to the existence of subsistence rights is 103 that they are not enforced and are not currently enforce104 able, particularly internationally. If it remains impossible 105 for a person to remedy the failure tomeet their rights, then 106 that right remains so useless as to be virtually meaningless. 107 This argument casts doubt on the universality of human 108 rights. In situations of widespread rights violations, like 109 those occurring under highly repressive regimes, it can be 110 impossible to enforce rights domestically or across 111 borders. 112 The debate over whether subsistence rights exist and 113 who is required to meet them involves a traditional dis114 tinction between negative and positive rights and duties. 115 Given this contrast, subsistence rights are positive rights; 116 to satisfy them requires assistance from duty-holders such 117 as national governments or the international community. 118 Negative rights, such as the right to liberty, can be 119 respected by every person – by not interfering with what 120 every other person has a right to do. While subsistence 121 rights also correspond to negative duties not to interfere 122 with people's ability to provide for themselves, it is often 123 assumed that universal guarantees of them will require 124 providing aid or services to some people. One libertarian 125 argument that subsistence rights are illegitimate is that 126 positive duties to satisfy them require coercive enforce127 ment that violates the right to liberty. 128 Shue argues that there is no real distinction between 129 positive and negative rights because actually securing lib130 erty, security, property, or any right whatsoever requires 131 extensive state action, such as a judicial system. A reply in 132 favor of the distinction is that positive and negative rights 133 differ with respect to the allocation of duties, particularly 134 globally. Onora O'Neill argues that, transnationally, 135subsistence rights cannot clearly be allocated to specific 136duty-holders. On the assumption that rights must corre137late with duties, if person X has a genuine right to Y, then 138some specific person or institution must be charged with 139a duty to respect, protect, or provide Y. For a right to exist 140in a particular situation, the rights-holder must be able to 141claim it from a person or institution that possesses 142a perfect (exceptionless) duty to satisfy it. We can easily 143identify who has violated a person's right to liberty and 144bodily integrity, when they have been sequestered and 145tortured. In contrast, there is no one to hold directly 146accountable when someone lacks for food, shelter, or 147medical care. O'Neill concludes that, until there are iden148tifiable international agents or institutions that can pro149vide people with what they need for subsistence, they do 150not have a right to it globally. Their deprivation may be 151otherwise unjust, but this is not due to a failure to respect 152existing subsistence rights. 153A response to this view is that it may not be possible to 154immediately identify violators of negative rights. For 155example, direct perpetrators of unjust imprisonment or 156torture may not be the primary perpetrators of rights 157violations when they are acting at the behest of political 158figures in distant, more powerful states. Rights violations 159of any type can require systemic political redress rather 160than identification of direct perpetrators. Elizabeth 161Ashford argues that negative rights would be no less vio162lated if they involved complex causal chains with many 163agents that result in multiplicative harms. She argues that 164every affluent agent has as-yet-unspecified imperfect 165global duties to do their share to reform and create just 166institutional structures to address the multiplicative 167harms of poverty. The poor can claim subsistence rights 168from those in a position to press for these changes. 169Thomas Pogge rejects this view and argues that global 170justice with respect to global poverty can be conceived of 171as a requirement on the part of wealthy nations to rectify 172the harms caused by their longstanding injustices toward 173poorer nations. Thus, the injustice of global poverty is not 174a failure to meet positive rights to subsistence but a failure 175to respect the negative rights of the global poor by depriv176ing them of subsistence. The extreme unfairness of the 177global economic order and the institutions that support it 178produce severe poverty and its consequent harms. The 179longstanding inability of the poor to meet their own 180basic needs was never the result of natural circumstances 181but arose historically through economic and political 182arrangements designed to favor the elites of poor coun183tries and the governments, corporations, and citizens of 184affluent countries. Those who create, support, and benefit 185from such arrangements are morally responsible for 2 S Subsistence Rights Comp. by: KJayaraja Stage: Galleys Chapter No.: 498 Title Name: EGJ Page Number: 0 Date:15/3/11 Time:18:02:04 186 causing global poverty and required to alter these arrange187 ments to alleviate it. 188 The question whether it is feasible to meet subsistence 189 rights or to rectify past harms, as in Pogge's view, is not 190 only economic but political and moral. For example, sat191 isfying an imperfect positive duty to secure subsistence for 192 every person would require substantial resources from 193 wealthier nations as well as reformwithin underdeveloped 194 and developing countries. Proposals such as the Tobin Tax 195 on international capital transactions or the Global 196 Resource Dividend could raise large amounts to meet 197 subsistence rights but do not have substantial political 198 support in wealthy countries. More modest goals such as 199 meeting the MDGs would require approximately 0.7% of 200 the Gross Domestic Product of developed countries, but 201 some countries have not paid. Satisfying the negative duty 202 not to deprive the poor of subsistence likely involves debt 203 forgiveness for developing countries, major reforms 204 of international institutions such as the World Trade 205 Organization (WTO), and alterations in the policies of 206 multinational corporations and wealthy nations. Such 207 reforms could be progressive but require greater political 208 will on the part of the citizens in wealthy democracies and 209 substantial empowerment for the global poor. 210 Assuming subsistence rights are feasible and legiti211 mate, their satisfaction would be an essential step in full 212 global economic justice. While arguments for these rights 213 do not directly address the many questions surrounding 214 what global justice requires in the way of economic redis215 tribution, successfully meeting these rights doubtless 216 involves some redistributive mechanism. 217 Related Topics 218 ▶Absolute Poverty 219 ▶Access to Essential Medicines 220 ▶Agency, Individual 221 ▶Autonomy 222 ▶Basic Rights 223 ▶Cosmopolitan Justice 224▶Development as Freedom 225▶Duties of Assistance 226▶Duties to Distant Needy 227▶Duties, Perfect and Imperfect 228▶Duties, Positive and Negative 229▶ Economic Rights 230▶ Foreign Aid 231▶Global Basic Structure 232▶Global Distributive Justice 233▶ Libertarianism 234▶Negative Rights 235▶Poverty 236▶ Shue, Henry 237▶ Special Rights 238▶Tobin Tax 239▶United Nations Millennium Development Goals 240▶Universal Declaration of Human Rights 241▶World Trade Organization 242References 243Ashford E (2006) The inadequacy of our traditional conceptions of the 244duties imposed by human rights. Can J L Juris 19:217–235 245Caney S (2005) Justice beyond borders: a global political theory. 246Cambridge University Press, New York 247Copp D (1992) The right to an adequate standard of living: justice, 248autonomy and the basic needs. Soc Philos Soc 9:231–261 249Geuss R (2001) History and illusion in politics. Cambridge University 250Press, Cambridge 251Gewirth A (1996) The community of rights. University of Chicago Press, 252Chicago 253Hertzel S, Minkler L (eds) (2007) Economic rights: conceptual, measure254ment, and policy issues. Cambridge University Press, New York 255Kuper A (ed) (2005) Global responsibilities: who must deliver on human 256rights? Routledge, New York 257O'Neill O (2000) Bounds of justice. Cambridge University Press, 258Cambridge 259Pogge T (2002)World poverty and human rights. Polity Press, Cambridge 260Pogge T (ed) (2007) Freedom from poverty as a human right: who owes 261what to the global poor? Oxford University Press, New York 262Shue H (1996) Basic rights: subsistence, affluence and U.S. foreign policy. 263Princeton University Press, Princeton Subsistence Rights S